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Agency, Causality and Properties 
 
In this paper, I want to try first to highlight, and then to question, an assumption which I think 
is often made by philosophers writing on topics which concern causation – of which of 
course, agency is one of the most important. The assumption is that in so far as a substance 
may be said to be the cause of any phenomenon, a better, fuller, and metaphysically more 
accurate view of the situation can always be had by looking to the properties in virtue of 
which the substance was able to cause the effect in question. I shall proceed by taking a look 
at a couple of different examples of places in the literature where it seems to me that this 
assumption has led philosophers astray. The first example concerns a case of causation in the 
inanimate world; the second, a case where the type of causation concerned is human agency. 
In both cases, I shall allege, an important mistake has been committed, and I shall try to 
diagnose its source. But in the first case, there are reasons for thinking that comparatively 
little damage may be done when the mistake is made. In the second, though, I shall argue, 
where the causation in question is agency, the mistake is disastrous – and I shall suggest that 
it leads both to a radical misunderstanding of the nature of agency, and ultimately to an unfair 
assessment of the prospects for a coherent version of libertarianism.  
 
(i) Humphreys  
 
In his (1989), Paul Humphreys denies that physical objects can really be causes. He accepts 
that such objects are attributed causal efficacy in ordinary talk, and offers as an example of 
such an ordinary implication the sentence ‘The car demolished the wall’. Here, it seems, if we 
take the English sentence at face value, the car itself is attributed causal efficacy vis-à-vis the 
effect which was the wall’s falling down. But Humphreys denies that what is said here can 
literally be correct. According to Humphreys, when cases such as this are examined more 
closely, it always turns out really to be some aspect of the object that was the real cause of 
the effect in question – for example, in this case, the high momentum of the car. Humphreys 
alleges that it is clear that it was not the car per se that demolished the wall, since a car 
parked touching the wall has no effect; and moreover any object of a similar size moving at 
similar velocity would have done as well as the car. We should infer, then, according to 
Humphreys, that it is really the car’s high momentum which was the cause of the wall’s 
falling down – and that the car itself ought not really to be said to be the cause. 
Before going on to look more closely at Humphreys’ reasoning here, I want to pause to point 
out, for a moment, how bizarre the conclusion of that reasoning is. A very simple reason for 
finding it odd is that verbs like ‘demolish’ – and many other sorts of verbs by means of which 
we appear to attribute effects to physical objects – are often given a causal analysis by 
linguists. ‘Demolish’, for instance, one might think, simply means something like ‘cause to 
fall down’ – and this is indeed how it, and many other similar verbs (e.g. ‘uproot’, ‘unravel’, 
‘raise’, ‘dissolve’, etc.) are generally analysed in linguistics. And given this premise, if the 
car demolished the wall it appears simply to follow that the car caused the wall to fall down. 
It seems that if we are to concur with Humphreys, our only options are (i) to deny the literal 
truth of the sentence ‘the car demolished the wall’; or (ii) to reject the causal analysis of 
‘demolish’. But surely neither of these alternatives is very happy. The first involves finding a 
perfectly ordinary sentence of English to be false in circumstances in which we would all 
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ordinarily agree it was true; and the second involves denying a well-established account of 
the workings of a certain large class of English verbs. It seems to me that it would be 
preferable, then, before turning to adopt either of these solutions, to take a closer look at 
Humphreys’ reasoning. 
Humphreys claims, recall, that we are prevented from acceding to the claim that it 
was the car itself that demolished the wall both by the fact that if the car had merely been 
parked touching the wall, nothing would have happened to the wall at all, and likewise, by 
the fact that any object with a similar amount of momentum would have demolished the wall 
just as well as the car. But – to take the first of these inferences first - why should it be 
thought to follow from the fact that the car wouldn’t have demolished the wall if it hadn’t 
been driven into it at high speed, that the car wasn’t really the cause of the wall’s being 
demolished? We cannot usually infer from the fact that A would not have V-ed if such and 
such had not been the case, that A did not V. For example, we can’t infer from the fact that I 
wouldn’t have read this book if it hadn’t looked interesting that I didn’t read this book. And 
the second inference looks no better, on the face of it. We cannot usually infer from the fact 
that another thing, B could have V-ed just as well as A did, that A did not really V. Why here, 
in the case of these specifically causal contexts, should it be thought to follow? 
The reason it has been thought to do so, I think – and not only by Humphreys – the 
line of reasoning he sketches is quite commonly found in the philosophical literature on 
causation - stems ultimately from the attempt to apply certain methodological principles to 
the example under consideration which are sometimes offered as guides to the discernment of 
true causal relations. In particular, it seems as though Humphreys is here attempting to make 
use of Mill’s ‘Method of Difference’ and ‘Method of Agreement’ in order to identify what 
was the true cause of the wall’s falling down in the case he imagines. Mill’s ‘Method of 
Difference’, as applied to causes, states that ‘If an instance in which the phenomenon under 
investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in 
common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the 
two instances differ is the ... cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon’. 
(Mill 1970:.256). This might perhaps seem to license the claim made by Humphreys, that 
since a parked car has no effect on the wall, it must be the car’s momentum rather than the 
car per se, which was the cause of the wall’s being demolished. And Mill’s ‘Method of 
Agreement’, as applied to causes, states that ‘If two or more instances of the phenomenon 
under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone 
all the instances agree is the cause ... of the given phenomenon’ (Mill 1970: 255). This might 
seem to license the claim made by Humphreys that since anything with similarly high 
momentum – but not e.g. anything of a similar colour, or made from a similar material or 
having the same shape – would have demolished the wall, the high momentum must be the 
cause of the wall’s falling down. But can these principles really be applied in the way in 
which Humphreys hopes to apply them to justify a preference for a property over a particular 
entity, when it comes to discerning what is the real cause of some phenomenon or other? 
Mill’s discussion of the ‘Method of Difference’ and the ‘Method of Agreement’ is 
part of his discussion of laws of nature. The question he is considering is how to single out 
‘from among the circumstances which precede ... a phenomenon those with which it is really 
connected by an invariable law’ (Mill 1970: 253). He gives as a rather gruesome example of 
use of the Method of Difference taking a bird from a cage and plunging it into carbonic acid 
gas (Mill 1970: 257). The bird was alive before the immersion in the gas; after immersion, it 
suffocates. It must, then, be the immersion in the gas, Mill suggests, which has caused the 
suffocation – since it is the one circumstance that has changed in the condition of the bird. All 
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the other things, we may suppose – temperature, pressure, etc., are just as they were before – 
or at any rate, we will try to ensure that this is so in performing our experiment. It is none of 
these things, therefore, but the thing which is different, the sudden presence of carbonic acid 
in the bird’s environment, which was the cause of the bird’s death. And as an example of the 
use of the Method of Agreement, he offers the discovery by Baron Liebig of the common 
factor present in deaths produced by metallic poisoning by means of compounds as various as 
arsenious acid and the salts of lead, bismuth, copper and mercury; all were discovered by 
Liebig to combine with animal products such as milk, muscle fibre and animal membranes in 
such a way as to inhibit further decomposition of these materials – decomposition on which 
they continuation of life in any organism turns out partly to depend (Mill 1970: 267). Thus, 
despite the apparent difference in the poisons involved, all were discovered by Liebig 
actually to have a common mode of operation which involves the chemical’s preventing a 
type of functioning crucial to the well-being of organic tissues from occurring as it ought. It 
seems obvious that Mill is here highlighting principles of scientific investigation which are 
widely recognised to be amongst the most important marks of the experimental method, and 
about the general validity of which, various minor qualifications and points of detail apart, 
there can be little doubt. Is Humphreys doing no more really, then, than applying what look 
to be sensible principles of empirical enquiry which have proved their worth many times 
over, to the particular case of the car and its properties? 
When considering the question how generally the Methods and Difference and 
Agreement may be applied, I think it ought to be borne in mind that for Mill, both methods 
are for utilisation in connection with the discernment of laws of nature. His interest is in the 
means of discovering which phenomena are ‘invariably connected’ with others – which of the 
‘circumstances’ which precede a phenomenon those which are connected with that (type of) 
phenomenon by a true law. But this context, it seems to me, is important to the understanding 
of how those principles are supposed to be applied. What sorts of things will these preceding 
‘circumstances’ be? I suggest that it will be best to think of them propositionally - essentially, 
the candidate causes should be thought of as facts to the effect that a certain general property 
or feature was present on the particular occasion in question. The element of generality is 
essential – for otherwise the idea of invariability makes no sense – nothing which is not at 
least potentially multiply instantiable can be ‘invariably’ connected with something else. It is 
true that it will not be the general thing itself, but rather the fact that it was instantiated on 
some particular occasion, which will be singled out as the cause of any given effect –  e.g.  
‘the fact that the wall was impacted by an object having such-and-such a degree of 
momentum’ will be the cause of its falling down. Or again: it may be a law that birds in 
general (and perhaps even animal life forms in general) die on exposure to a sufficient 
quantity of carbonic acid gas; and it may likewise be a law that no animal life can survive the 
type of interference with the natural processes of putrefaction that contact with a sufficient 
quantity of metallic salts tends to produce – and knowing such things as this may help one 
divine on a given individual occasion that this bird has died because it was plunged into a 
particular mass of carbonic acid gas, and this person has died because their tissues have 
responded with the usual reaction to the ingestion of some particular quantity of metallic salt. 
But the crucial thing is that all potential contenders for the prize of true cause in the 
individual case, for Mill, will be in the same ontological category as one another – they will 
all alike be facts about the instantiation of certain general properties, features or aspects of 
situations by certain particular entities. There is no question, for Mill, of applying the 
Methods of Difference and Agreement so as to adjudicate the putative competing causal 
claims of particulars, on the one hand, and their properties, on the other, to argue for 
metaphysical conclusions about which sorts of ontological entity are best suited to be 
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accounted causes. Since both are methods which are concerned essentially with the 
discernment of laws, they are designed from the first to operate within a domain in which all 
the possible candidate causes are instantiations of general features or properties. They are not 
suitable for assessing the pretensions to causal status of such things as the particular entities 
which instantiate these features or properties themselves. The methods are, moreover, 
principles of empirical and not of ontological enquiry – they are for use by scientists in the 
attempt to discover which types of general phenomena are causally related to which others, 
not for use by philosophers, attempting to regiment the notion of causation. It seems to me, 
then, that the use that Humphreys has attempted to make of the Methods of Difference and 
Agreement is a misapplication of an empirical method in the service of metaphysical ends. 
 Confusion here is encouraged, I think, by the fact that causation and explanation are 
closely related concepts.  This means that in our assessment of what is ‘the real cause’ in 
instances of causation, there are often methodological principles at work which sustain an 
understandable preference, in certain sorts of case, for causal explanations which mention 
aspects or properties of substances over those which mention only the substances themselves. 
It is certainly not hopeless, when confronted with the question, say, why someone who has 
been poisoned has died, to say that a given quantity of arsenic was the cause – that is a causal 
explanation of sorts. But if we can say, in addition, that it was because arsenic forms salts of 
a type which react with organic matter in such a way that natural processes of decomposition 
are disrupted, we do better – we locate the property of the arsenic in virtue of which it acts as 
a poison on the human body. But we must be careful here not to mix up the metaphysics of 
causation with the heuristics of explanation. It may be right to say that if we want an 
explanation of why the person died, we are generally likely to be more satisfied if we have 
some account in general terms of the properties in virtue of which arsenic acts as a poison. 
But first, it is not completely obvious that we should always prefer an explanation in such 
general terms over a mention of the particular cause. Sterling Lamprecht, a great champion of 
the claims of particular causes, writes as follows, in criticism of the view of Schlick that 
causation is nothing but ‘regularity of sequence’:  
 Sitting in my home at night, I may hear a knock at the door. Someone might 
chance to tell me that, always and invariably, according to a law of nature, 
sound results from the reverberation of a solid block of wood which is 
disturbed by blows upon it, and that this explanation is the full and entire 
causal account of the knocking. Would I be satisfied? Would you? Would 
even Moritz Schlick? The laws of nature in terms of which a particular 
knocking might be adequately described would probably not be of much 
interest to you or me or Schlick at that moment. I am sure that I should want to 
know who or what concretely was making blows on the door. I should want to 
identify the specific agent who or which did the knocking ... That there would 
be uniformity of result in similar cases would be of no account to me at the 
moment. (Lamprecht 1967: 121-2). 
And second, even if it is usually true that explanations in terms of general properties are 
preferable to those which cite only particular, substantial causes, it simply does not follow 
from this, as is often assumed, that it is the general properties that ‘do the causal work’. 
Certainly it follows that properties, or facts involving them, can be used to do important 
explanatory work in accounting for why something occurred. But might it not be a category 
mistake to suppose that properties do causal work? Jonathan Lowe has argued recently that 
events cannot do causal work, because they do not have causal powers, and the same might, I 
think, be plausibly said of properties. Poisonousness, for example, seems to be a property, but 
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poisonousness is surely not naturally thought of as something which has powers; rather, it 
seems itself to be a power. What has the causal power to produce changes in other entities is 
surely the poisonous thing itself – the arsenic or the bismuth or the mercury.  
 Lowe himself goes further than this; in addition to claiming that substances are the 
only proper bearers of causal power, he claims also that it is substances which are the relata 
proper of the causal relation. To say this, I think, might be to overreact to the worry about 
causal power as Lowe himself seems to recognise in some places.
1
 For even if events and 
properties do not have causal powers, it need not follow that they cannot be causes - for 
perhaps there are kinds of causes, the kind that events, properties and facts are, which cause 
things in ways other than by exerting causal powers. Perhaps, for instance, as I have argued 
elsewhere (Steward 1997) there are causes which trigger other events by occurring, and to 
occur need not be to exercise any kind of causal power. Or perhaps there are causes which 
matter, which are relevant, to the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of particular effects without 
being efficacious. But still, Lowe is surely right to question whether we can move smoothly 
from the observation that it is often more appropriate and more helpful to cite and event or a 
property as the cause of something than it is to cite a substance, to the conclusion that it is 
never really the substance which ‘does the causal work’, that the substance simply drops out 
of the causal metaphysics, giving way gracefully to the items which are offered in what are 
judged to be the fuller and more detailed explanations of what has happened. 
My own view, in fact, is that the question what the relata of the causal relation are, though 
often posed, is simply not a sensible one. It is not true either that events are the relata of the 
relation, nor that substances are –nor indeed that any other of the multifarious candidates that 
have been proposed (e.g. facts, processes, properties, tropes,etc.) are its relata – because there 
simply is no single relation that is the causal relation – nor is causation always and 
everywhere a relation at all. Causation is best thought of as a category – a large and 
ontologically flexible umbrella concept under which we bring a wide diversity of 
ontologically various relations and relationships, unified only by their connections to our 
interest in the explanation of how things have come to be and why they have (or have not) 
changed. We need to ask why it is obligatory to suppose that causation has an ontology in the 
first place. After all (as is frequently observed), items in almost all the ontological categories 
it is possible to think of are spoken of as causes – objects, persons, events, facts, states, 
properties, and so on. Why think that any of these ways of speaking can be sensibly thought 
of as revelatory of the ontology of causation? Might not the simple truth be that we need a 
plurality of irreducibly distinct ontological categories to do justice to the totality of causal 
phenomena? 
If this is indeed the simple truth, the way should be clear to embrace a pluralism about 
causes which will enable us easily to avoid Humphrey’s unpalatable and absurd conclusion 
that cars cannot demolish walls. Cars can demolish walls all right. When they do so, it is 
perfectly true, of course, that some of their properties are relevant to the fact that they have 
this demolishing ability, and some are not. But that does not mean that these properties 
demolish the walls – nor indeed that any horrid surrogate entities – such as tropes or property 
instances or exemplifications of properties at times – do so. Demolition is simply not a job 
                                                          
1
 “I speak of ‘causal  relations’ in the plural here advisedly, because I think it is tendentious to assume that there 
is such a thing as ‘the’ causal relation, although this assumption is very widespread amongst contemporary 
analytical metaphysicians ... some causal statements undoubtedly have an event-causal formulation ... However, 
we also have what might be called ‘mixed’ causal statements, such as ‘The bomb caused the collapse of the 
bridge’ in which the grammatical subject of the verb ‘to cause’ is a noun- phrase denoting a particular persisting 
object or individual substance ... (Lowe, 2008: 142). 
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for a property. It is the sort of job that only something like a car – with mass, momentum and 
volume – could do. 
 I want to turn now to look at a second kind of argument in the literature where I think a 
similar kind of reluctance to credit substances with powers they really have and a preference 
for ceding those powers to their properties can be found. This time, though, the mistake 
occurs in connection with the explanation of human action and the related mistake may be, I 
think, both more important, and harder to see. 
 
(ii) Mele’s Argument 
An example of the second kind of argument is offered by Al Mele in his book, Free Will and 
Luck.  Mele formulates what he calls ‘a problem about luck for libertarians’ as follows. He 
notes that the typical libertarian believes that a free decision to A, made by a given agent, at a 
particular time t, could, at that very moment, have gone the other way – the agent could have 
decided at t not to A, instead. In the actual world, this agent – following Mele, I shall call him 
Joe – decides at t to A. But in another world with the very same laws of nature and the very 
same past, the libertarian believes, Joe decides at t not to A. But in that case, Mele argues, the 
libertarian faces the following difficulty: 
If there is nothing about Joe’s powers, capacities, states of mind, moral character, and the like 
in either world that accounts for this difference, then the difference seems to be just a matter 
of luck. And given that neither world diverges from the other in any respect before t, there is 
no difference at all in Joe in these two worlds to account for the difference in his decisions... 
the difference in his decisions ... [is] just a matter of luck (Mele 2006: 9). 
And if the difference in his decisions in these two possible worlds is just a matter of luck, 
Mele goes on to ask, how can it have been in any sense up to Joe which decision was made? 
How can it have been up to him which possible world became actual? And unless we can see 
that which decision was made was up to Joe, unless which possible world became actual was 
up to him, how on earth does the indeterminacy which has been posited by the libertarian 
contribute to his freedom and moral responsibility? 
What I am interested in here is not the argument offered by Mele taken as a whole, 
but rather a particular aspect of it – that is, the link which Mele attempts to make between 
there being nothing about Joe’s powers, capacities, states of mind, moral character, and the 
like, to account for the difference between the situation in which he decides at t to A and the 
situation in which he decides at t not to A, and its being a matter of luck that Joe does what 
he does. Clearly, more really needs to be said, in order to tackle this inference, about what it 
is for something or other to be a ‘matter of luck’, but a full discussion of the concept of luck 
would be a complex matter which would take me well beyond the bounds of this paper. Let 
me try to cut the work short, then, by observing that what Mele seems to need in order for his 
argument to go through, is for it to follow from its being a matter of luck whether Joe decides 
at t to A or decides at t not to A that it not be up to Joe what in fact gets decided. Rather than 
discuss the concept of luck in more detail, then, let me just home straight in on this 
implication of the understanding of it that Mele seems to need. What he appears to want to 
insist is that if there is nothing about Joe which could account for the difference between the 
situation in which he decides at t to A and the situation in which he decides at t not to A, it 
could not be up to Joe which thing happens. And that is the inference I want to question.  
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The inference, I take it, is from there being no property of Joe’s which one might 
point to in order to explain why he decides in one way rather than another, to its not being up 
to  Joe whether he does the one thing or the other, to Joe’s not really being the source, the 
true agent of what happens. But why should we accept that any such inference is in order? 
Let me distinguish between two kinds of reason one might have for believing that such an 
inference might be valid. One reason might have to do specifically with thoughts about 
rationality – it might be said, for instance, that in order for a decision genuinely to count as 
the true action of a human agent, it must be made for a reason. And in that case, it might be 
said, the agent’s appreciation of the preponderance of the weight of that reason, or its 
preponderance over the reasons which argue for the alternative course of action can then be 
cited in explanation of what she does, must be part of the explanation of why she decides as 
she does. Relevant properties of the agent – properties concerning relative strengths and 
weights of beliefs and desires, for instance - will therefore always be available to explain why 
she does what she does, provided we have an instance of true agency at all. I do not think the 
premise of this line of thought – that actions must be done for reasons - is true, nor do I think 
the inference it involves is valid, but I want to set it aside for the purposes of this paper, 
because it requires a discussion of the relation between agency and rationality which would 
take me much too far afield. What I want to focus on is another kind of reason I think one 
might have for believing that the inference from ‘there is no property of the agent which 
could explain why one thing happened rather than another’ to ‘it was not up to the agent what 
happened’ might be valid. This second reason, I think, is belief in a principle which might be 
stated in something like the following way: when a substantial thing does anything or acts in 
any way, what it does must always be something which is explicable in terms of certain 
properties which it antecedently possessed – and more specifically, if it does one thing rather 
than another, then that must be explicable in terms of its antecedently possessing certain 
properties rather than certain others. If this were true, Mele would, I think, be within his 
rights to infer that since there is, by hypothesis no such explanation in the case of Joe, that he 
cannot really have been the agent of the inexplicable occurrence which is therefore called his 
‘decision’ only by courtesy. But I want now to argue that the principle presupposes 
determinism, and so that the libertarian should have no qualms about its rejection.  
The easiest way to see that the principle presupposes determinism, I think, is to begin 
by thinking about the inanimate entities which might be involved in indeterministic 
occurrences. For instance, suppose a radioactive atom indeterministically ejects a particle at t. 
Then the radioactive atom might be said to have brought about certain consequences in the 
universe (that a particle was ejected at t rather than not, for example, together with any 
possible further consequences of this ejection) without any of the prior properties of the 
radioactive atom having been relevant to the fact that the question whether or not a particle 
would be ejected at t was settled with an ejection rather than a non-ejection. It might be 
retorted that the atom might at least possess properties which made it probable that it would 
eject a particle at t, rather than not, and that these could be cited in the explanation. But of 
course this need not be so. We can, indeed, increase the plausibility of the claim that the 
atom’s antecedently existing properties were irrelevant to the explanation of the fact that it 
ejected a particle at t rather than not, by imagining that any objective probabilities existing 
and relating to the ejection were such that they made an ejection at t exceedingly unlikely. For 
in that case, it would not even be plausible that we could appeal to the thought that the 
radioactive atom (and its environment) somehow embodied these objective probabilities to 
ground the supposition that certain of its properties must have been explanatorily relevant to 
what happened. There seems, then, in a case like this, to be nothing we can say about the 
radioactive atom which gives us any help with explaining why the particle was ejected at t 
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rather than not. And yet the atom ejected a particle all right. It brought about consequences in 
the world by ejecting a particle, even though none of its properties was explanatorily relevant 
to the question why the particle was ejected at t rather than not.  
We have here, then, a simple case in which an object does something – in this case, 
ejects something – in such a way that no property of that object can be cited in explanation of 
why it did that thing rather than not. Now, of course, I am not suggesting that human actions 
are events which should be thought of as random in the same way as radioactive emissions 
might be supposed to be – precisely not. A radioactive atom is certainly not the kind of thing 
that something could be ‘up to’ because it has no control over its own parts; it is not a 
possessor or controller of a body in the way that an animal or human being can be. The point 
of the example is not to suggest that there is no significant difference between random 
radioactive emissions and full-blown actions, but rather merely to cast doubt on the principle 
that an enduring entity’s role in the unfolding of the world must always be exhausted by the 
relevance of its properties to explanations of why the world in fact unfolded in the way that it 
did (rather than in some other way) – to cast doubt on the inference I am imagining we might 
be being invited to make by Mele from ‘there is no difference at all in Joe in these two worlds 
to account for the difference’ to ‘there is no role for Joe here in the unfolding of reality’. If 
there are to be true actions, I should like to maintain, we need for it sometimes not to be the 
case that the way things unfold depends only on the way they already are – even if some of 
those ways things are, are ways things are with us. Action, so it seems to me, introduces into 
the world another kind of dependence entirely from the kind which is exploited by 
explanations of how things turn out in terms of how things antecedently were – dependence 
on an agent, as opposed merely to dependence on the way the agent is. Showing that this is so 
is of course a difficult endeavour with many parts and I do not intend to attempt to show it 
here. But a necessary part of the project is showing that it does not follow from the fact that 
none of an entity’s properties is relevant to the explanation of why a particular sort of event 
happened at a given time rather than not, that the entity itself did not produce that event. The 
libertarian should insist that it is not because something about us makes us act, or explains 
why we act, but simply because we act, that it is up to us what happens to our bodies. None 
of this implies, of course, that our properties are never causally relevant to the question why 
we do what we do – that would be an absurd conclusion. My claim is only the much milder 
one that when it comes to the sort of contrastive explanations of why an agent has done a 
particular thing at a time rather than doing some other thing, or rather than merely not doing 
that thing, there need be nothing at all to say of a sort that relates to properties the agent 
antecedently possessed in the one case but not in the other. And if there is indeed nothing at 
all to say, that need not prevent its being the case that what occurred was up to the agent. 
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